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BIDDING BEHAVIOR AND DECISION COSTS
IN FIELD EXPERIMENTS
JOHN A. LIST and DAVID LUCKING-REILEY*
Whether rationality of economic behavior increases with expected payoffs and
decreases with the cognitive cost it takes to formulate an optimal strategy remains
an open question. We explore these issues with ﬁeld data, using individual bids from
sealed-bid auctions in which we sold nearly $10,000 worth of sports cards. Our results
indicate that stakes do indeed matter, as high-priced ($70) cards produced more of
the theoretically predicted strategic behavior than did lower-priced ($3) cards. We
ﬁnd additional evidence consistent with the importance of cognitive costs, as subjects
more experienced with sports card auctions exhibited a greater tendency to behave
strategically than did less experienced bidders. (JEL D44, C93)
I. INTRODUCTION
Positive opportunity costs of mental effort
may invalidate the predictions of traditional
models of rational (or hyperrational) agents.
Conlisk (1996) uses deliberation costs as a
recurring theme when discussing four impor-
tant reasons for incorporating bounded ratio-
nality in economic models. Smith and Walker
(1993) and Smith and Szidarovszky (1999)
present effort models that predict individual
behavior will more closely match the predic-
tions of rational-behavior theories as (1) the
stakes of the decision increase, and (2) the
decision costs decrease. Smith and Walker
(1993) ﬁnd evidence of these two effects in
a comprehensive review of 31 published lab-
oratory experiments. Camerer and Hogarth
(1999) extend Smith and Walker’s survey by
examining 74 experimental papers and ﬁnd
evidence in favor of the cognitive-effort the-
ory, noting that “higher levels of incentives
have the largest effects in judgment and deci-
sion tasks” (p. 34). Although the laboratory
evidence is compelling, there has been little
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veriﬁcation of these predictions outside the
laboratory.
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The present article ﬁlls this gap by exam-
ining ﬁeld data from 214 multiunit sports
card auctions carried out in an active mar-
ketplace: on the ﬂoor of a sports card show.
We auctioned four types of trading cards
with book values ranging from $3 to $70,
providing signiﬁcant variation in the stakes
of the auction. Our auctions also included
two distinct types of subjects: Some auc-
tions had sports card dealers bidding against
each other, whereas others had individual
card collectors as the participants. This vari-
ation allows us to explore the second dimen-
sion of decision-cost theory: Do dealers, who
commonly participate in sports card auc-
tions and therefore likely require less effort
to bid optimally, bid more rationally than
nondealers? Our measure of “rational” bid-
ding comes from multiunit auction theory,
which predicts strategic “demand reduction”
in uniform-price auctions.
2 For each type of
1. Note, however, the similarities of increasing
rewards with the parallel literature that compares hypo-
thetical and actual responses within incentive compatible
mechanisms. See, e.g., List (2001) and List and Shogren
(1998).
2. A recent wave of theoretical literature has investi-
gated equilibria in uniform-price auctions with multiunit
demand (e.g., Noussair [1995], Katzman [1995], Teno-
rio [1997], Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [1998], and
Ausubel and Cramton [1997]). One main result is that in
uniform-price auctions, bidders have a dominant strat-
egy to truthfully reveal their demands for the ﬁrst unit of
the good, but they have an incentive to reduce their bids
below their valuations for additional units. The incen-
tive is that one’s bid on an additional unit might end up
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bidder and each type of card, we measure this
demand-reduction behavior in the uniform-
price auction relative to a control (the mul-
tiunit Vickrey [1961] auction) where bidders
are predicted to fully reveal their demands.
Our sports card data, generated from sales
of 428 cards with a combined book value of
nearly $10,000, provide two major insights.
First, we ﬁnd that the predicted strategic
behavior is considerably greater when the
auctioned cards have higher values. Second,
dealers exhibit more of the predicted strate-
gic behavior than do nondealers, for both
lower and higher priced cards. One conjec-
ture to explain this ﬁnding is that nondeal-
ers may ﬁnd that the cognitive effort required
to bid strategically exceeds the beneﬁts, espe-
cially for low-valued cards. By contrast, deal-
ers have more experience with auctions and
make their living by buying/selling/trading
cards, so their cognitive costs are likely much
lower than those of nondealers. These two
ﬁndings are consistent with recent theoreti-
cal models of monetary rewards and decision
costs, and extend previous experimental evi-
dence from the laboratory into the ﬁeld.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
As mentioned, recent theoretical literature
has suggested that demand reduction inher-
ent in uniform-price auctions with multiu-
nit demand can induce inefﬁcient allocations
and possible reductions in auction revenue.
To avoid the inefﬁciencies associated with the
uniform-price auction, theorists have identi-
ﬁed an alternative mechanism, the general-
ized Vickrey auction, which gives bidders a
dominant strategy of revealing their true val-
uations for all units of the good. In this mul-
tiunit Vickrey auction, as in the uniform-price
auction, each bidder can submit up to n dif-
ferent sealed bids on individual units, and the
highest n bids are declared winners. If a bid-
der submits one or more of the winning bids,
his or her price for the ﬁrst unit equals the
highest rejected bid submitted by someone
else, and his or her price for the kth unit
equals the kth highest of the rejected bids
determining the price paid for winning a single unit, so a
lower bid has some chance of increasing one’s consumer
surplus. The economic consequences of demand reduc-
tion include inefﬁcient allocations and possible reduc-
tions in auction revenue.
submitted by others.
3 This is a special case
of a Groves-Clarke mechanism for dominant-
strategy truth telling.
4
For our purposes, the auction literature
provides predictions about strategic behav-
ior on which to base a test of cognitive
costs and rewards. Theory predicts second-
unit bids to be lower in the uniform-price
auction than in the Vickrey auction. If delib-
eration costs are important, then we should
ﬁnd that demand reduction in the uniform-
price auctions is more prevalent for higher-
priced cards, because bidders will tend to
invest more effort in thinking about the sub-
tle strategic incentives when they stand to
gain more from such effort. We have a similar
prediction about dealers versus nondealers.
Dealers routinely participate in sports card
auctions both to sell and acquire their card
stocks; even though they may never have par-
ticipated in these particular auction formats,
they may exert less cognitive effort to ﬁnd
optimal strategies than nondealers with less
prior auction experience of any kind. Because
dealers make their living selling cards and
typically sell cards for higher prices than non-
dealers, the monetary rewards to strategic
behavior may also be much larger for dealers.
Both effects predict more strategic demand
reduction for dealers than nondealers.
To test these predictions, we combine
data from two ﬁeld experiments. The ﬁrst
data set is taken from List and Lucking-
Reiley (2000), who gathered data at a 1998
Orlando trading card show. The second data
set is new and was gathered at a 2001 Tuc-
son trading card show. In the ﬁrst experi-
ment (denoted experiment I), we conducted
82 Vickrey and 82 uniform-price auctions.
Our participants were of two types: card
dealers and nondealers, each bidding against
rivals of the same type. The auctioned sports
cards ﬁt into two price categories: low (book
3. Technically, these rules are demand-revealing
only in cases where every bidder’s demand curve is either
ﬂat or downward-sloping, as is assumed in the theoreti-
cal works cited. If bidders have upward-sloping demands,
then this simple pricing rule is invalid; a slightly more
complicated set of instructions would be required to
implement a Groves-Clarke truth-telling mechanism.
4. See Groves (1973) and Clarke (1971). Intuitively,
the key feature of this mechanism is that when bidders
truthfully reveal their willingness to pay for the goods,
the price rule ensures that each winning bidder pays an
amount equal to the surplus he or she displaces from
the other bidder(s) who would have won in his or her
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value of $3) and high (book value of $70).
For the low-priced card auctions, we chose
a Joe Montana 1982 Topps football card
and a 1989 Michael Jordan Hoops basket-
ball card. For the higher-valued auctions, we
selected a Cal Ripken Jr. 1982 Topps baseball
card and a Barry Sanders 1989 Score foot-
ball card. In experiment II, we conducted 25
Vickrey and 25 uniform-price auctions for the
1982 Topps Joe Montana football card using
both dealers and nondealers. In both experi-
ments, all auctions for a given card type dis-
played the same sports cards to bidders, and
identical copies were sold to winning bidders
after the auctions concluded.
To perform the simplest ﬁeld experiment,
we chose a design with two bidders and two
cards per auction. Two bidders were invited
to submit two bids each for two identical
sportscards, in an auction with no reserve
price. We chose the auction format and card
type for each subject according to a predeter-
mined schedule, to avoid accidentally intro-
ducing experimenter bias. After receipt of
bids from a group of subjects within a treat-
ment, we randomly matched pairs of bidders
to determine the outcome of each two-person
auction. Each participant’s experience typi-
cally followed four steps: (1) inspecting the
good, (2) learning the auction rules, (3) plac-
ing two bids, and (4) concluding the trans-




The upper panel in Table 1 provides a
breakdown of the number of auctions com-
pleted. The numbers in the table represent
the number of auctions run for each treat-
ment type. For example, in experiment I
we ran 15 uniform-price dealer auctions for
Cal Ripken Jr. cards, which implies that
we sold 30 Cal Ripken Jr. cards to dealers
in uniform-price auctions. The lower panel
in Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of
our bidding data. In List and Lucking-Reiley
(2000), we noted that the data in experi-
ment I provide evidence of strategic demand
reduction—across all ﬁve treatments, second-
unit bids are lower in the uniform-price auc-
tions than in the Vickrey auctions. Here,
5. Experimental instructions are available on
request. For more details about the experimental proce-
dure, see List and Lucking-Reiley (2000).
we push these data somewhat harder and
note that the amount of demand reduction
appears to vary both with the stakes of the
experiment ($3 versus $70 cards) and with the
level of bidder experience (nondealers versus
dealers).
Before comparing the strategic behavior
across dealers and nondealers, we point out
two apparent differences in their underlying
demands for cards. First, evidence from both
experiments suggest that dealers’ demands
tend to be situated at a higher level than
those of nondealers for the Joe Montana card
(book value $3), which was the only card
auctioned to both types of bidders. In both
Vickrey and uniform-price auctions and for
both ﬁrst and second units of the good, mean
bids are higher for dealers than for nondeal-
ers. Second, dealers’ demands also appear to
be less steeply sloped for the Montana card.
In the Vickrey auction, where bids should
equal bidders’ true values, we ﬁnd that deal-
ers value a second unit at $0.77 and $0.73
(about 38%) lower than a ﬁrst unit, on aver-
age, while the corresponding decline for non-
dealers is signiﬁcantly larger, at $0.90 and
$0.86 (about 60%–66%). This second effect
also appears in the data for $70 cards, though
the comparison is less clean because the cards
auctioned to the two groups were not identi-
cal. First-unit bids on $70 cards are relatively
similar across subject types, but demands are
again less steeply sloped for dealers than
for nondealers. The mean decline between
ﬁrst and second Vickrey auction bids is $7.83
(16%) for dealers, but $23.00 (44%) for non-
dealers.
Strategic Behavior is Evident Primarily
for High-Priced Cards
The third and fourth columns in the lower
panel of Table 1 provide strong evidence
of strategic demand reduction. As the the-
ory predicts, second-unit bids are typically
lower in the uniform-price auction than in the
Vickrey auction. Average Vickrey bids exceed
average uniform-price bids by approximately
$12 for the high-priced cards and by only
$0.05–$0.30 for the low-priced cards. One
exception to this ﬁnding is average second-
unit bids in the nondealer Montana auctions
in experiment II.
The ﬁgures present a graphical depic-
tion of the data. First, consider the data614 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 1
Experimental Design and Descriptive Statistics
Nondealers Dealers
Card Type Book Value ($) Uniform Vickrey Uniform Vickrey
Experiment I
Barry Sanders 70 17 17 — —
1989 Score
Cal Ripken Jr. 70 — — 15 15
1982 Topps
Michael Jordan 3 25 25 — —
1989 Hoops
Joe Montana 3 15 15 10 10
1982 Topps
Experiment II
Joe Montana 3 15 15 10 10
1982 Topps
Descriptive statistics
Bid #1 Bid #2
Vickrey Uniform Vickrey Uniform
Experiment I
Sanders [ND] $51 82 $62 35 $28 82 $16 62
23 44 25 67 19 98 15 40
Ripken [D] 49 60 62 67 41 77 30 60
15 19 15 28 14 46 13 43
Jordan [ND] 1 73 1 83 0 91 0 82
1 51 1 35 1 04 0 85
Montana [D] 2 03 2 49 1 26 0 94
0 86 2 18 0 84 0 85
Montana [ND] 1 37 1 40 0 47 0 42
1 33 1 44 0 53 0 61
Experiment II
Montana [D] 1 88 1 95 1 15 0 63
1 46 1 09 0 92 0 72
Montana [ND] 1 45 1 44 0 59 0 63
1 55 1 38 0 65 0 69
Notes: Figures in the top panel represent the number of auctions run for each treat-
ment. For example, the ﬁrst row indicates that we ran 17 uniform-price auctions and
17 Vickrey auctions, for a total of 68 Barry Sanders cards sold. Each auction had two
invited bidders who submitted up to two bids each. Figures in the lower panel represent
means [standard deviations] in plain (italic) text. [ND] denotes nondealer treatment;
[D] denotes dealer treatment. Bid #1 (#2) data consists of the ﬁrst (second) bid sub-
mitted by each bidder.
from auctions for $70 cards: Ripken (deal-
ers) in Figure 1 and Sanders (nondealers)
in Figure 2. In each case, we note that
the distribution of uniform-price (second)
bids clearly lies to the left of the distribu-
tion of Vickrey bids, which we interpret as
strategic demand reduction in the uniform-
price auctions. In stark contrast are non-
dealers’ second-unit bids on the $3 cards:
Jordan in Figure 3 and Montana in Figure 4
(pooled data from experiments I and II). In
these cases, the Vickrey and uniform-price
bid distributions look nearly indistinguishable
from each other, though the mean Vickrey
bid remains numerically slightly higher than
the mean uniform-price bid.
For each of the seven different card
treatments, we compute: (1) t statistics
for the hypothesis that mean second-unit
bids are equivalent across auction formats,
and (2) nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-
sum tests of treatment differences. The
rank-sum test is a standard nonparamet-
ric test that has a null hypothesis of noLIST & LUCKING-REILEY: BIDDING IN FIELD EXPERIMENTS 615
FIGURE 1
Dealer 2nd-unit Bids (Ripken)
FIGURE 2
Nondealer 2nd-unit Bids (Sanders)616 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
FIGURE 3
Nondealer 2nd-unit Bids (Jordan)
FIGURE 4
Nondealer 2nd-unit Bids (Montana)LIST & LUCKING-REILEY: BIDDING IN FIELD EXPERIMENTS 617
treatment effect, or that the two sam-
ples are derived from identical popula-
tions. Results are always consistent with
one another; to conserve space we present
only the parametric results: experiment I,
tSanders ND = 2 82, tRipken D = 3 10, tJordan ND =
0 47, tMontana D = 1 19; tMontana ND = 0 34;
experiment II, tMontana D = 1 99; tMontana ND =
−0 24.
6 The t statistics all have the expected
positive sign (expect for experiment II,
nondealer Montana), indicating that mean
second-unit bids were larger in the Vickrey
auctions than in the uniform-price auctions.
7
The differences, however, are statistically sig-
niﬁcant only for the two high-value cards and
in one of the low-value card auctions (exper-
iment II, dealer Montana).
We conclude that the demand-reduction
effect appears larger when the stakes are
higher. This is true not only in dollar mag-
nitude but also relative to the variance of
bids (as measured by t tests). Subjects may
have considered the stakes in the $3 card auc-
tions not to be large enough to warrant care-
ful consideration of strategies and therefore
made less than perfectly strategic second-unit
bids.
8 This is consistent with the previously
6. We report results of a large-sample t test, which
requires no distributional assumptions. We are mak-
ing the large-sample assumption with sample sizes as
small as 20; to check robustness we also conducted
small-sample t tests. The results were never qualitatively
different.
7. Further evidence of demand reduction can be
obtained by examining the difference between each bid-
der’s ﬁrst- and second-unit bids, a measure of the steep-
ness of each bidder’s downward-sloping bid schedule. In
each case, the mean difference between ﬁrst-unit and
second-unit bids is much larger in the uniform-price than
in the Vickrey auction. For example, differences between
bid one and bid two were $7–$23 in the Vickrey auc-
tions for expensive cards, compared with $30–$45 in the
uniform-price auctions. For the low-priced cards, bids
differed by $0.80–$0.95 in the Vickrey auctions, and up
to $1.50 in the uniform-price auctions. We note one
caveat to this differencing approach: We typically do
not ﬁnd equality of ﬁrst-unit bids across auction formats
(especially for high-priced cards).
8. Note that the crux of our argument in this
section relies on the assumption that the optimal strat-
egy always involves demand reduction and that the $70
card auctions have higher expected rewards than the $3
card auctions. Because the theoretically optimal strategy
varies with the true distribution of bidder values, neither
of these conjectures is necessarily true. It is possible that
because of intrinsic differences in bidder values, some
cards should have more demand reduction than others in
Nash equilibrium. Because we are not using induced val-
ues, true values are not directly observable. Fortunately
for our purposes, the main difference between the shapes
cited literature on deliberation costs in labo-
ratory experiments.
Strategic Behavior Increases with Experience
We also ﬁnd evidence in favor of a
second prediction of cognitive-cost theory:
that strategic behavior is more pronounced
when agents have more experience. Because
dealers generally have more experience with
auctions than nondealers, we examine differ-
ences in strategic behavior between dealers
and nondealers. We focus on bidding behav-
ior for the Joe Montana card, the only
card bid on by both dealers and nondealers.
Descriptive statistics in the lower panel of
Table 1 indicate some evidence of dealers
behaving more strategically than nondealers.
The difference in mean second-unit bids
between the Vickrey and uniform-price auc-
tions is $0.32 and $0.52 for dealers (roughly
25%–45% of the mean Vickrey bid), but only
$0.05 and −$0 04 for nondealers. Although
the nondealer differences are not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero at conventional lev-
els using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of
treatment differences or a parametric t test,
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences for dealers
in experiment II in both the nonparamet-
ric and parametric statistical tests: t = 1 99,
and marginal signiﬁcance in experiment I
of the low-stakes and the high-stakes value distributions
is that the low-stakes cards appear to have values skewed
toward zero. The theory generally predicts the opposite
of what we observe: When values are more concentrated
at zero, there should be more strategic demand reduc-
tion in uniform-price auctions. Although not proven in
general, this claim is substantiated by several examples
provided in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and
Ausubel and Cramton (1996). The intuition for this claim
(more demand reduction with lower distributions of val-
ues) is that the gains from demand reduction are greater
when one’s second-unit bid is more likely to actually
determine the price, which can only occur when other
bids are sufﬁciently low. Thus differences in bid distri-
butions do not appear to be the reason for the observed
lessening of demand reduction in our low-stakes exper-
iments. Furthermore, as a consistency check, we exam-
ined the Vickrey bids across the $70 and $3 auctions
as an informal test of the expected rewards hypothesis.
Though this procedure represents a rough test because
it relies on truthful revelation and low relative cogni-
tive costs in the Vickrey auctions (in the present context,
there is really no way to determine how people men-
tally process auction mechanisms), we ﬁnd that expected
proﬁts are $29.58 (Sanders) and $18.50 (Ripken) in the
$70 auctions and $1.50 (Jordan) and $1.06 (Montana) in
the $3 auctions, which are signiﬁcantly different at con-
ventional levels.618 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
 t = 1 19 . These results are considerably
strengthened if we pool the data across
experiments I and II. On doing so, we com-
pute a t statistic equal to 2.25 for the dealer
data, which allows us to reject the null at the
p<0 05 level (results are consistent when
using a nonparametric test). Even after pool-
ing the nondealer data, we cannot reject the
null at conventional signiﬁcance levels using
either a nonparamteric or parametric test.
Figure 4 provides a visual comparison
of the nondealer second-unit bids for the
Joe Montana card. Figure 4 reveals very
little difference in the distribution of bids
between the two auction formats. By contrast,
Figure 5 (pooled dealer Montana data) shows
stark differences in dealers’ bidding behav-
ior between auction formats. Besides the fact
that there are many more zero bids in the
uniform-price auction than in the Vickrey
auction (13 versus 6), the distribution of
uniform-price bids lies to the left of the dis-
tribution of Vickrey bids.
An alternative test of demand reduc-
tion provides stronger statistical support of
the experience hypothesis. As in List and
FIGURE 5
Dealer 2nd-unit Bids (Montana)
Lucking-Reiley (2000), we examine whether
the slopes of individuals’ bid schedules are
steeper in the uniform-price auction than
in the Vickrey auction. In other words, we
test whether the difference between an indi-
vidual’s ﬁrst-unit bid and second-unit bid is
greater in the uniform-price auction, as pre-
dicted by demand-reduction theory. Though
dealers’ bid schedules are slightly ﬂatter than
nondealers’ bid schedules in the Vickrey auc-
tion (consistent with better resale opportu-
nities for multiple units), their bid schedules
are somewhat steeper than those of non-
dealers in the uniform-price auction. Once
again, performing parametric and nonpara-
metric tests of differences in bid differences
across auction types, we ﬁnd statistical sig-
niﬁcance at the p<0 04 (experiment I) and
p<0 07 (experiment II) in the dealer data
using a one-sided alternative and no statisti-
cal signiﬁcance (one-sided p values: p = 0 44
and p =0 40) for nondealers. On pooling the
data we again ﬁnd much stronger evidence of
demand reduction in the dealer data—now
we can reject the null at the p<0 01 level
using a one-sided alternative.LIST & LUCKING-REILEY: BIDDING IN FIELD EXPERIMENTS 619
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recent evidence from the laboratory indi-
cates that predictions of rational models may
fail if the cognitive costs of ﬁnding opti-
mal strategies are large compared to their
expected rewards. We explore this issue in the
ﬁeld by auctioning off nearly $10,000 worth
of sports cards in 214 different auctions. Our
results suggest that strategic behavior and
expected payoffs are positively correlated:
Bidders exhibited strategic demand-reduction
behavior much more for high-priced cards
than they did for lower-priced cards. A sec-
ond result is that subjects more experienced
with sports card auctions exhibited a greater
tendency to engage in demand reduction than
did less experienced subjects. The effect of
the size of the stakes is much more pro-
nounced than the effect of the bidder type.
In particular, we ﬁnd pronounced evidence
of strategic behavior for goods worth around
$70. For goods worth around $3, by contrast,
we ﬁnd no evidence of strategic behavior for
inexperienced bidders and some evidence of
strategic behavior for experienced bidders.
The size of the stakes and bidder experience
both help explain when strategic behavior is
more likely.
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